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1 will be concerned here with the issue of the self-referential or 
reflexive nature of reason that Nitezsche's perspectivism and anti-
foundationalism illuminates. I will apply Nietzsche's anti-
foundationalism and his insights about language and reason to a 
contemporary attempt by Jürgen Habermas to once again ground morality in 
necessary conditions of reason, this time beyond subjectivist epistemology 
on purported necessary conditions of speech. The chapter will conclude 
with a similar application of related insights from Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. 
I. Postmodernism1 and Reflexivity 
One of the most powerful recent attempts to salvage a modernist 
demand for moral necessity in a postmodern form is in the work of Jürgen 
Habermas. Habermas sees his work as "postmodern" because he has 
jettisoned any epistemology based on a philosophy of the subject and moved 
to communication and language as the appropriate place for grounding any 
claim and demand of rationality for moral ought. 
Habermas's argument against other postmodernists, particularly 
poststructualists,2 rests largely on the self-contradictoriness he finds in 
1 Ignoring the well known problems of the term "postmodernism," a number 
of strands have converged, loosely to be sure, which can be included under 
the rubric "philosophical postmodernism." These include American 
Pragmatism, Heidegger and post-Husserlain phenomenology, 
Wittgenstein, Foucault, Dcrrida, Richard Rorty, and others. Nietzsche 
does share something in common with this group and it is this commonality 
with regard to anti-foundationalism that will be the major focus here. 
2 Poststructuralism is a term referring to a movement growing out of the 
structuralism of Levi-Strauss. Structuralism is largely a critique of 
subjectivism, the view that language and society are products of conscious, 
intentional action. Structuralism attempts to show that conscious behavior 
is largely predetermined by impersonal objective structures governing the 
selection of words and the patterning of social interaction. 
Poststructuralism shares the structuralist critique of subjectivism but is 
suspicious of any such attempt to found the human sciences on universal 
structures, seeing this kind of rationalism as lending itself to technologies 
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their radical historicism, relativism, and contextualism. He argues that in 
attempting to make valid claims about things, poststructuralists and 
postmodernists must presuppose the possibility of universal assent. 
Otherwise, their position would not have any power to persuade others 
who share a different set of cultural assumptions. They commit what he 
calls a performative contradiction. 
Thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault, 
however, are not trying to persuade others of the truth of their views. 
Rather, they are attempting to overcome a representational view of 
language and any universalist assumptions about reason in order to open a 
space for a different way of seeing things, one that is not dominated by such 
assumptions. There is a double bind, however, that menaces any criticism 
of rationalism: one cannot escape using the very categories and language 
one is renouncing. The devices and strategies postmodernists use, turn 
language and logic in on themselves in order to reverse the hierarchical 
dichotomies inherent in Western philosophy and social organization, but 
are thereby self-undermining because they are reflexive or self-referential. 
Hegel's dialectic was already a recognition of this basic feature of 
thought, but Hegel was still a modernist in his absolutist assumptions 
about reason and subjectivity, and in his attempt at perfect closure in an 
Absolute Mind. In contrast, the postmodernist recognition of the reflexivity 
of reason is at the heart ot their radical critique of the rationalist 
assumptions of modernism and is a tool for dislodging such assumptions.3 
Habermas has recognized the "problem" of self-referentiality or 
reflexivity in postmodern philosophy, but has failed to see that to 
criticize postmodern thought for this is to criticize it for one of its most 
of domination. Poststructuralists argue that the basic rules, norms, and 
structures governing linguistic and cultural practices are not rigidly fixed, 
but undergo constant mutation. They emphasize the contextuality and 
relativity of all structures, including those governing so-called rational 
behavior. The leading poststructuralists include Derrida and Foucault. 
Derrida's approach to literary criticism is called deconstructionism. 
Foucault's questioning of the power relations that underlie social structure 
is called genealogy. This overview is taken from David Ingram, Critical 
Theory and Philosophy, (New York: Paragon House, 1990). 
3 In Hegel's dialectical unfolding, any truth, any moment of the self 
realization of consciousness, can only proceed in its own terms and will 
eventually manifest its opposite. Anything finite, any "being," issues forth 
its own negation. Hegel, however, seeks closure to this process in ultimate 
thought thinking itself. The whole process itself is seen as ultimate truth 
and reality. The being of the process, the becoming itself, the totality of 
all becoming is itself absolute. Hence, Hegel's dialectic is a recognition of 
the reflexivity of reason and at the same time an attempt at closure. This 
closure along with Hegel's idealism would be denied by postmodernists. 
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important revelations: that all reason is inescapably self-referential or 
reflexive. When this is understood, then such a charge can no longer be an 
argument against postmodern thought, which, since Nietzsche, has 
intentionally employed tactics that reveal just this feature of any rational 
system. 
The problem of self-reference or of reflexivity in Nietzsche is well 
known, for example, if Nietzsche's perspectivism is true than it is a 
counterexample to itself. But Nietzsche's work may only be self-
destructive when it is read from a standpoint which aims at, demands, or 
presumes foundationalism, absolutism, or universalism. This would seem to 
distinguish it from problems of self-reference found, for example, in certain 
famous paradoxes such as the liar's paradox, Russell's contradiction that 
undermined Frege's logicism, or the Logical Positivists' principle of 
verification which cannot be verified by itself. Such problems of self-
reference are devastating when they undermine some kind of 
foundationalist project, i.e., the attempt to find a bias by which truth, 
knowledge and reality claims can be legitimated. The problem of 
reflexivity is also at the heart of one of the most important discoveries in 
mathematics and logic in the twentieth century.4 
The problem of self-reference can be found as well in any form of 
determinism, for example, in Spinoza or Kant, not to mention more recent 
versions such as Skinner's. If determinism were true, then it would be 
impossible to know it is true, because anyone holding such a view or its 
contrary would be determined to do so and any rational decision about it, 
which, of course, requires the freedom to rationally choose one of the 
alternatives, would be impossible. Hence, determinism is self-
undermining. 
The paradox of Kant's determinism is even more pronounced. Though 
he is a determinist with regard to the empirical world of appearance, Kant 
postulates a noumenal realm of freedom and moral agency. The necessary 
conditions for any possible knowledge, the forms of space and time and the 
categories of understanding, rule out any possible knowledge with regard to 
human freedom, since all knowledge is knowledge of phenomena. This 
makes the world of human freedom and action impossible in a purely 
deterministic Newtonian realm of phenomena. Hence, it is only through an 
unknowable practical/moral realm of pure reason that we can meet the 
demands of justice. This requires a transcendental argument. Such an 
argument employs the technique of arguing from what is given or what must 
4 In its earliest form reflexivity as a strategy dates back to Sextus 
Empiricus and Pyrrhonism whose techniques of refuting dogmatism have 
been formalized in Coedel's theorems on relative undccidability and 
relative unprovability of consistency. See John Kadvany, "Reflections On 
The Legacy Of Kurt Goedel: Mathematics, Skepticism, Postmodernism," in 
The Philosophical Forum, Vol. XX, No. 3, Spring 1989. 
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be accepted, back to its necessary conditions, to what must be the case if the 
given were to be possible. Such arguments have been used in the attempt to 
achieve universal foundations for truth, knowledge, and justice. As we 
shall see, Habermas makes recourse to a transcendental argument for the 
universal conditions of rational discourse. Ironically, this leads to a self-
referential contradiction in his own thinking. The irony, of course, is that 
he repeatedly levels the charge of self-referential contradiction at 
Nietzsche and other postmodernists, such as Foucault and Derrida. 
Because these thinkers are anti-foundationalists, however, and use the 
techniques of turning reason in on itself, the charge of reflexive 
contradiction is not only hollow but misses one of their most central insights 
and contributions with regard to the critique of reason. 
Postmodern philosophers are sensitive to the problems that are 
inherent in language and reasoning for any attempt to achieve certainty 
and foundations through universal truth of any kind. They have 
attempted to expose the self-undermining assumptions of dichotomous 
hierarchical ways of grasping the world via binary logic, and thereby 
make categorical, universalistic, absolutist, rationalistic epistemology and 
traditional metaphysics outmoded. Postmodern philosophy does not 
attempt to be, nor does it wind up being a merely anti-modern as Habermas 
charges. It is not simply a part of Hegel's dialectic, in which modernism 
gives rise to its negation in postmodernism. This would be to accept the 
very absolutist and all encompassing kinds of assumptions that rationalists 
down to Hegel had embraced. Postmodernism does not gain its identity 
merely from the rejection of modernism. It is a recognition that there are 
other ways of seeing things. After seeing that rationalist assumptions 
about reason, language and truth are reflexively self undermining, that is, 
rationalism fails in terms of its own expectations and demands of certainty, 
representation and absolutism, it simply changes the subject, as Rorty puts 
it. It moves to a different perspective, and thus uses reason while avoiding 
the rationalist assumptions of universality and absolutism. These 
rationalist assumptions lead to a view in which reflexivity is thought to 
be a damning but avoidable flaw in reasoning. It is damning, however, only 
to any thought that fails to penetrate itself sufficiently. 
Only in texts of those who do not carry through the 
logic of their position is reflexivity apparently avoided. 
In such cases, however, it is simply submerged. The 
deconstructive technique employed by Derrida indicates 
that reflexive paradoxes can be found in any text, so long 
as they are examined closely...While reflexivity cannot 
be avoided it also cannot be allowed to destroy meaning. 
The importance of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida is 
that they have all faced this dilemma. All have sought 
to harness reflexivity into a positive force, rather than to 
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eradicate its destructive paradoxes...Nietzsche 
advocates anarchic assertion; Heidegger, endless 
postponement; and Derrida perpetual unravelling. Each 
of these alternatives proposes a new mode of using 
language.5 
The writings of Nietzsche and postmodernists cannot be reduced to the 
form of theories merely proposing alternative accounts of truth, value and 
language within the framework of rationalist assumptions. Postmodernism 
is a kind of gestalt shift that is made possible by a more thoroughgoing 
critique of rationalist assumptions about truth, language and meaning. 
Habermas sees Nietzsche as the beginning of postmodernism and the 
"totalizing critique of modernism."6 But he does not as clearly see that 
Nietzsche is consciously putting reflexivity to a particular use of 
destabilization. Nietzsche is not merely committing serious errors in 
thought that lead to incoherence which unwittingly undermine any 
attempt at fixing limits and foundations. Rather, that one inevitably 
arrives at such incoherence in any attempt to reason to some absolute truth, 
is a major, if not utterly transforming, insight. Nietzsche seems intent on 
pursuing such insight, not arriving at "the truth."7 
5 Hilary Lawson, Reflexivity: The Postmodern Predicament (La Salle, 111.: 
Open Court, 1985), p. 125. 
6 "With Nietzsche, the criticism of modernity dispenses for the first time 
with its retention of an emancipatory content...As a counterauthority to 
reason, Nietzsche appeals to experiences that are displaced back into the 
archaic realm—liberated from all constraints of cognition and purposive 
activity, all imperatives of utility and morality. A breakup of the 
principle of individuation becomes the escape route from modernity." 
Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1987), p. 94. 
7 The notion of "truth" itself has traditionally implied closure. If one has 
the truth, any further movement could only be a deviation from it. The 
notion of "insight" avoids this connotation. Any insight does not prevent 
the movement to further insight. The notion of "truth" seems to suggest 
correspondence of our thinking and language, insofar as it is correct, with 
some objective reality outside and independent of ourselves. This 
correspondence conception of truth has various idealist and realist as well 
as rationalist and empiricist formulations, such as Plato's Forms and 
Descartes clear and distinct ideas, as well as Locke's material substratum 
and primary qualities, and Berkeley's God. Even in Hume, knowledge (and 
truth) was correspondence to immediate though contingent impressions. It 
was in Kant that this correspondence view is overthrown in favor of a 
coherence view in which any necessary truth involves conformance to the 
conditions of knowledge, as opposed to any claims to specific empirical 
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We should not confuse Nietzsche's view of truth as one more theory of 
truth, a kind of relativism. Nor should we draw the conclusion that, given 
Nietzsche's perspectivism, any "insight," opinion, or point of view is as 
good as any other. Inherent in any perspective is a valuing, a hierarchy 
that permits distinctions and judgement. We should therefore not draw the 
conclusion that any "insight," opinion or point of view is as good as any 
other. The common superficial and hasty conclusion that if Nietzsche is 
"right" than anything goes, is unwarranted. This assumption can only arise 
in the mind of someone already addicted to the assumption and pursuit of 
absolutes. Such a person commits a fallacy in saying that if there is no 
absolute then chaos reigns, or that anything is permitted. Divisive and 
binary modes of thought and conceptions of truth, when seen as 
foundational or held uncritically, make possible such unwarranted but 
seemingly inescapable conclusions. There are, however, obvious 
alternatives that make this dilemma false. Nietzsche provides such 
alternatives. What Habermas misses here, because he is so threatened by 
this totalizing critique, is that Nietzsche is not merely one who is 
throwing out "the philosophic baby with the subjectivist bathwater." 
Nietzsche is not an irrationalist, but one who no longer sees rationality as a 
fixed or universal structure.8 For him reason is a flexible tool an nothing 
universal can be claimed about it. Distinctions of A and not-A only have 
knowledge, which would only be contingently true. But in neither case is 
truth a correspondence, as in former philosophy. 
8 It should be obvious that neither Nietzsche's view nor postmodernism 
generally is irrationalism or anti-rationalism, nor is it a variant of 
romantic holism. It is not a rejection of reason but a rejection of the idea 
that reason provides a foundation, and that it can tell us what we ought to 
reason about. Consistency and order is crucially important. Operating by 
and complying with laws of an ordered society, the rules of language, etc., 
are a sine qua non for human life, without which we would not be able to do 
what we want to do or even be in a position to generate or experience our 
wants. But there is nothing in a consistent system of language or society 
that requires by reason in any foundational sense that its assumptions and 
its particular order be accepted as "true" or "right." They are just 
uncontroversial or desired to be so. They are just uncontrovcrsial or desired 
to be so. They are pragmatic and at least tolerated until some other system 
of order replaces them. Order and consistency are not avoidable. Order is 
omnipresent. As Bergson says even so-called "disorder is simply the order 
we are not looking for." "Disorder" is an ordering, otherwise it would not be 
recognizable at all. (See Henri Bergson, "The Possible and the Real," in 
The Creative Mind (New York: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1975), p. 116. For 
Nietzsche, the awareness of ordering is always from some perspective, and 
a perspective is a valuing. Such valuing or "esteeming" precedes and makes 
possible a desire for order and "truth." 
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perspectival fixity, no universal fixity. With Nietzsche, the dichotomies 
presented by reason is foundational or essential are undermined. They arc 
no longer necessary conditions. Imagination and creativity come to replace 
the rationalist categorical thinking about reality, essences, right and 
wrong, and objective certainty. The dichotomies of subject versus object, 
relative versus absolute, etc., are left only as misleading relics of an 
either/or, true/false, binary logic that is no longer reified as the structure 
of reality and thought itself. The law of non-contradiction is itself part of 
a way of seeing things. Not something prior to and governing of that 
seeing. A way of seeing things is what is primary and is the context in 
which arguments and reasoning have their life.9 
Nietzsche's "truth" cannot be judged by logic alone because his 
thinking destroys the barrier between psychology and logic. Motives and 
desires give to logic its status. 1 0 The desire for exactness and universal 
9 There is a point in every philosophy when the philosopher's 
'conviction' appears on the stage..." F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good And Evil, 
and Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans, by Walter Kaufman (New York: 
Modern Library, 1968), p. 205. It is instructive to turn to Wittgenstein in 
this regard ar well. For Wittgenstein certainty is a matter of one's 
convictions. "Not that I could describe the system of these convictions. Yet 
my convictions do form a system, a structure. L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 
ed. by C. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper, 1972), 
Section 102...And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful 
point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of 
what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of 
departure, as the element in which arguments have their life." (Sec. 105) 
"Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings." (Sec. 229) 
"Only the accustomed context allows what is meant to come through 
clearly." (Sec. 253) "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief 
that is not founded." (Sec. 253) "What is a telling ground for something is 
not something I decide. I know = I am familiar with it as a certainty." (Sec. 
271-272) In both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein conviction is at the base of 
any argument, not the truths of reason which only facilitate and defend 
these convictions. 
1 0 "Behind all logic and its seemingly sovereignty of movement, too, there 
stand valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the 
preservation of a certain type of life. For example, that the definite 
should be worth more than the indefinite, and mere appearance worth less 
than 'truth'—such estimates might be, in spite of their regulative 
importance for us, nevertheless mere foreground estimates, a certain kind of 
niaiserie (folly, stupidity, silliness] which may be necessary for the 
preservation of just such beings as we are. Supposing, that is, that not just 
man is the 'measure of things'--" F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good And Evil, in 
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absolute truths so prevalent among philosophers is so intense that it is 
assumed that this desire must have an objective basis, an object that is 
independent of the desire for this object, and which is independent of the 
creativity that generates or "discovers" it. 
Habermas recognizes Nietzsche's criticism of the idea that thinking 
extends to the deepest abysses of being but misunderstands its aim and 
significance. Habermas still sees reason as fundamental, albeit as 
communicative reason. Nietzsche's view of art or aesthetic awareness and 
style as distinct from reason, and as providing an alternative to its 
categories, is taken by Habermas as merely a mistaken and premature 
assessment of the nature of reason. Habermas tenaciously follows Kant in 
seeing the aesthetic as a moment of reason rather than reason as a moment 
of aesthetic creativity, as Nietzsche does. 1 1 He therefore misses what 
Nietzsche has opened up for us in removing the shackles and tyranny of the 
assumption of the absolute sovereignty an primacy of reason. 
Nietzsche's purposefully destabilizing writing forces the reader into 
an aporia that, if it does not result in a rejection and a turning away from 
Nietzsche's work is merely self-refuting and incoherent, leads to an 
opening, the possibility of a creative shift in perspective.1 2 His work 
seems decidedly aimed at undoing the apparent fixity of any thinking and 
is an attempt to move us to a much greater reverence for the particular, the 
moment, the individual, and away from ihe general, the universal, in order 
to make room for genuine individuality. 
Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans, by W. Kaufman (New York: Modern 
Library, 1968), p. 201. See also pp. 202-204. 
1 1 It is no coincidence that philosophies of imagination and creativity 
have been relegated to a secondary role, if dealt with at all, in the history 
of Western thought. Imagination has been see as the faculty by which 
sensation is either taken in by way of memory or by which we rearrange 
these sensations into fictions, always assuming the primacy of rationality 
as the central function whether on an empiricist or rationalist account. On 
this see Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1976). 
1 2 Nietzsche is questioning the motives and presuppositions which lie 
behind any writing or interpretation. Reading and writing are never 
innocent, never escape projections of value onto the world and onto 
language. In fact, far from being a neutral medium of conveying points of 
view which reveal such motives and presuppositions, language is itself 
implicated. Language determines the parameters of what kind of 
philosophy a culture will produce and how they will see themselves and 
the world. Nietzsche exposes this more clearly than anyone before him. 
See, for example, F. Nietzsche, Twilight Of The Idols, in The Portable 
Nietzsche, ed. and trans, by Walter Kaufman (New York: Viking Press, 
1954), p. 482-3. 
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Nietzsche certainly is hostile not only to the Western tradition of 
metaphysics, but to any such attempt at going beyond, at fixing, or 
grounding. Still, he is in the Western intellectual tradition and is imbued 
with its language, and uses its conceptualization to move in his thinking. 
Yet Nietzsche's writing has the potential for constantly breaking and 
renewing limits, and is not an attempt at fixing them. He does not aim at 
the truth. He does not struggle, as his near contemporaries Frege and 
Husserl do, to find a foundation for certainty. Rather, he undermines any 
such attempt, particularly with the use of seemingly problematic terms 
and points of view that continually seem to undermine themselves.13 This 
is not a flaw as Habermas would have it. What Habermas misses is that 
self-referentiality is inescapable. It lurks in his own thinking. 
II. The Reflexive Paradox in Habermas 
We find the self-referential paradox of Habermas's communicative 
rationality just where one would expect to: in the central feature of his 
discourse ethic, i.e., the possibility of rational consensus. This refers to the 
acceptance of a norm by all speakers without compulsion as being in their 
interest, based on an ideal speech situation of complete fairness and 
impartiality. The support for the objectivity of this ideal speech moment 
is in the form of a transcendental argument. Habermas's discourse ethic 
depends not on what persons might happen to agree were basic rights and 
duties, but on what everyone must recognize as a basic right or duty simply 
in order to engage in discourse at all. To engage in discourse without 
granting these rights and duties would constitute a "performative 
contradiction." These rights and duties, as the necessary rules for the 
possibility of conversing, dictate that only the force of the better argument¬ 
-not prejudice, coercion, or special advantage—prevails. 
It may seem at first glance that none of this presents a problem for 
Habermas. He is a pragmatist. His ideal consensus is a procedural guide, 
not a stipulation of content. There is nothing people have to agree on 
1 3 Nietzsche's own central notions of will to power, the Übermensch, eternal 
return of the same, and nihilism, though related, are not mutually 
implicative in a "system" that replaces older metaphysical accounts. 
Nietzsche is hostile to "systems" that overlook the plurality and 
particularity of the world. 
Metaphysics from Plato to Kant had been the attempt to fix limits to 
know things with certainty. Even Hegel, whose historicism nearly moves 
beyond this, still ends in an absolute limit or fixity. Kant and Frege 
showed us that limits in the form of logical and transcendental 
requirements for knowledge and communication may well be absolutely 
necessary, but we now realize that no such limit is absolute. This 
realization begins in Nietzsche. 
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ahead of time in terms of content except the guidelines on what would make 
this a just consensus community. The appeal is to the stronger argument. 
And whenever a stronger argument is made we are compelled by reason, not 
some fixed truth, to accept the force of argument. The content can vary and 
the conclusions as to what to believe and what to do can vary so long as it is 
warranted by force of the better argument. But this must all be in 
compliance with procedural rules that Habermas is trying to show as the 
necessary conditions for the communicative process in arriving at consensus. 
Here is where we find the terms/rules that require fixity, but are 
required by themselves to be open to debate and hence, subject to change. 
His procedural rules would dictate how those same procedural rules 
themselves are or can be argued about and changed; hence, self-
referentiality or reflexivity. These rules would turn out to be neither 
universal nor fixed, nor necessary, because they are open to change on the 
same basis as any of the content that they govern in the process of 
argumentation. Once Habermas is forced to subject these rules to their own 
scrutiny and self-maintenance, we introduce something evolutionary, not 
fixed. This, one may say, is just what we want and is perfectly consistent 
with pragmatism. Pragmatism, yes, universalism, no. 
The paradox is that if these rules apply to themselves then and 
require themselves to change, then what rule would govern this change? 
The old ones? The new ones? For a piugmatist this would not be a problem 
as long as the change meets the pragmatic demands of new circumstances. 
But to a true universalist, the rules must govern all speakers regardless of 
time and place, otherwise, the rules are not truly universal, and former and 
future speakers operating according to different rules would, by definition, 
be acting irrationally and therefore immorally. 
Any rule that has to justify itself is never a candidate for the 
objectivity that Habermas is after. If he denies that he is after 
objectivity, then he is deceived about his own pursuit and contradicts what 
he himself says when he argues that morality requires universality. If 
some kind of objective based on some universal feature that we all share in 
common (interests, entitlement, obligation, necessary conditions of 
discourse, etc.) is not at issue, then we could only appeal to a democratic 
majority, rather than appeal to the objectivity of reason. This of course 
opens the undesirable possibility of the abuses and potential tyranny of a 
majority. Habermas wants both the solidarity of democracy and the 
protection of individuality which he assumes must be grounded in some 
universal. 
The idea of uncoerced consent to the force of the better argument in the 
ideal speech situation implies, for Habermas, that everyone under these 
ideal conditions, would consent to the better argument. This ideal 
objectivity grounded in communicative reason goes beyond pragmatism as 
we saw. It tries to fix fixity. The rules must be fixed to ensure objectivity. 
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but this assumption about standards of reason, albeit a communicative 
reason dictating the speech acts of the lived world, is a reversal of order. 
Reason and the logic of consensus arise out of the lived world, out of the 
desire for justice, not vice versa. If we are truly pragmatic then we would be 
willing in some circumstance to bend or give up the procedural rules, 
depending on our goals, but the rules require consent from everyone in order 
to ensure a minimal solidarity. There are serious problems here; for 
example, what if not everyone is able to see the force of the better argument 
about these rules themselves? Another problem is the gap between real 
individuals and the abstract notion of an ideal moment of communication, 
in which any participant in discourse would rationally agree to the same 
procedural rules. This suffers from the same kind of problems as ideal 
observer ethics and its variant in Rawls's "veil of ignorance" and "original 
position," in which the rational agent has general knowledge but no 
specific information. This is literally a view from nowhere. 1 4 
1 4 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1971). Whatever the appeal of Rawls's theory, there seems to 
be no solid basis for justifying his assumptions about human beings upon 
which he bases the principles of justice. His theory starts with the 
assumptions of the contract tradition of the sovereignty of the individual 
(especially Rousseau and Kant), and the ideal of the rational moral agent. 
So his theory is based on individual rational choice, what we might call 
the Socratic/Kantian bias. The theory has an internal coherence, but can it 
justify itself by recourse to something external to the assumptions it begins 
with? He begins with an account of the relation of natural and moral 
sentiments and the explanation of the three laws of moral psychology. 
Natural sentiments, such as reciprocity, are psychological facts which tend 
to foster moral sentiments. The progressive stages of moral development 
outlined in the three laws of moral psychology seem to be supported by 
facts of human experience. We cannot deny these facts. Nor can we deny 
our propensity to promote our own good and to use reason in the achievement 
of that good. AH of this points to the necessity of morality for the survival 
of society and therefore the individual. But here Rawls moves from the 
facts of what we think we need to the necessity and universality of 
morality. If we already share certain general biases about what is good 
and right, Rawls's way of seeing the world and his subsequent arguments go 
a long way toward giving us "reasons" with which we can support and 
justify our shared desire and bias for fairness, respect, love and concern and 
other commonly held concepts of good. The original position, veil of 
ignorance and difference principle are very effective and useful devices for 
ensuring the degree of fairness we want. But there are nonetheless, 
unsupported assumptions or convictions with which Rawls initiates his 
theory: what we hold to be good for us and the Socratic/Kantian bias of an 
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The overall paradox of Habermas's work is that the more he 
generalizes about an ideal consensus, a transcendental unconditioned 
moment of communication, the less he is talking about the referents of his 
discourse, i.e., feeling, thinking individuals. From a Nictzschean 
standpoint, however, he is creating discourse that indicates his own desires 
and aspirations and hopes, not something universal upon which to ground 
moral obligation.15 The existence of moral agreement or any agreement 
about the conditions of morality and consensus remains contingent. The 
attempt to search for the grounds for justice and morality in facts or for 
proof in a logic of preconditions, "reflects an exaggerated fear of 
disagreement...Such proof is no more available in ethics than elsewhere. 
Even in those areas where we do have proofs (e.g., Euclidean geometry,! the 
proofs are not presuppositionless but function within a particular context, 
within a particular game." 1 6 
Habermas's demand for the objectivity of an ideal reciprocity is based 
on the standpoint of the generalized other. Moral dignity and 
objective reason that, when seen clearly, will provide an unambiguous 
"choice" of the good and principles of justice. 
To adjust the requirements of the original position in terms of 
generality, finality and publicity so everyone is highly and equally 
rational and therefore, would choose something like Rawls's two 
principles of justice, is equivalent to using the notion of an ideal observer 
who chooses without regard to specific biases and information but in 
accordance with egalitarianism and fairness in determining any 
inequalities. Of course this is a vantage point from literally nowhere. It 
suffers from the same gap as Kant's enigmatic connection between the 
abstract moral law and the particularity of an individual agent. The 
circularity produced is that the two principles are necessary and justified, 
since they are automatically the most rational choice anyone would make, 
because they are the most rational choice one could make in the original 
position. But the use of the original position is justified because it produces 
the most rational and egalitarian choice. If we accept Rawls's initial 
convictions or biases toward rationality and the good, then were are likely 
also to accept his special conditions of choice and the two principles that 
would necessarily result. Without the "thin theory of the good" no 
rational choice would even be possible in the original position, but even 
this "thin theory" indicates a way of seeing the world that presupposes 
and even makes such theorizing seem plausible. 
1 5 According to Nietzsche, philosophy is really only "the personal 
confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir." 
Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans, by Walter 
Kaufman (New York: Modern Library, 1968), section 6, p. 201. 
1 6 Paul Johnston, Wittgenstein And Moral Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1989), pp. 85-86. 
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1 7 Thomas Flynn in "Foucault and the Politics of Postmodernity," in Nous 
23, April 1989, pp. 191-92. 
1 8 Foucault continues the kind of genealogical criticism inspired by 
Nietzsche and traces the rationalist ideas of individuality, liberty, 
justice, truth, and logic back to systems of thought serving the interests of 
social and political domination. He rejects the humanist ideal of self-
determining subjectivity as a meaningless contradiction because it sees the 
individual as cause of itself. The subject and what counts as true 
meaningful statements is a function of the intersection of objective patterns 
of speech and behavior governed by impersonal rules which impose order 
by excluding certain types of statements from the realm of permissible 
discourse. These rules are themselves governed by power relations which 
are a function of arbitrary violence perpetrated for maintaining a system of 
domination. Foucault eschews global analyses of economic and class 
domination in favor of empirical functionalist analyses. 
1 9 From Foucault's "Was Ist Aufklarung?." Quoted by Thomas Flynn in 
"Foucault and the Politics of Postmodernity," in Nous 23, April 1989, p. 187. 
2° Flynn, p. 193. 
consideration then is derived not from the concrete individuality of the 
other, but abstracts from this to what we have in common, something 
universal and objective. Postmodernists tend to look to the concrete history 
and identity of the individual in seeking to understand their needs, 
motivations, desires and goals. They seek to recognize and confirm the 
other through individuality rather than objective universality. 
The failure to see the implications of one of the central insights of 
postmodernism, about the self-referentiality of discourse and reason, can be 
seen clearly in Habermas's debate with Foucault. 'The force of Habermas's 
basic objection, that Foucault is incapable of avoiding self-refutation so 
long as he is caught in his brand of historicism, is valid only on the 
assumption that Foucault is committed to a universalistic ideal of 
communicative transparency (or at least consensus) by the very fact of 
proffering his analyses to us . " 1 7 But of course Foucault has no such 
commitment. To the contrary, Foucault is attempting to expose the external 
relations of power that constitute the practices and discourses of the human 
sciences.18 
In his lecture on Kant, "Was Ist Aufklärung," Foucault assures us that 
the Aufklarung is an event or process whose spirit we should keep alive, 
not a set of principles to be preserved at all costs: "Let us leave to their 
piety those who wish to keep the heritage of the Aufklarung intact. This 
piety is the most touching of treasons." 1 9 'That any of the claims of the 
Enlightenment thinkers should be held be held beyond questioning . . . is 
contrary to the critical spirit of that great event itself, a violation of its 
guiding ethos."2 0 
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The fact that Habermas is surprised at Foucault's interest in 
emancipation and the very idea of enlightenment, and that Foucault sees 
himself as being in the train of development from Kant's notion of 
enlightenment, indicates that Habermas has not understood the 
"postmodernists" well enough.2 1 For one thing, he lumps them together as 
presenting a denial, an escape from the consequences of modernity, a 
totalizing critique of modernity. He sees the dedifferentiation of the 
spheres of rationality as a regression to something premodern. The 
postmodernists are instead offering criticism, true to the spirit of 
modernity, that also questions the very foundations of its own legitimacy. 
"Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. . . The 
point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
transgression."22 
Derrida's "transgression" and critique expose internal inconsistencies of 
meaning by reversing and destablizing traditional hierarchical 
dichotomies. He attempts to show that even though we can't escape the 
categories of our thinking and language, we can expose them in such a way 
that produces a "trembling," i.e., their fixity is called into question, is 
shown to be unstable. But we have no other way than our language and its 
categories to do this. To be firmly entrenched in a language, as each of us is, 
is to be positioned, so to speak, so that such trembling is rarely obvious. 
Boundaries and fixity are prerequisites to a form of language and life. 
Kant's basic insight about imposing order is helpful here. We impose order 
and "truth" unaware, and it is only in the work of a Hume or a Kant that 
we feel a trembling, especially in areas like theology and philosophy 
where, as Wittgenstein puts it, language has "gone on holiday." But we 
always return to the life-world, and the mundane and its comforting order. 
The assumption of universals and absolutes is common, but the attempt to 
ground and justify them has been a theological and philosophical 
enterprise. 
III. Beyond Universalism and the Quest for Foundations and Certainty 
Living with uncertainty, and flourishing, is not characteristic of this 
transition period, the postmodern period. Our expectations of certainty in 
the face of its loss elicits many different responses. Nietzsche's is one of 
elation. This may be horrifying to those who seek certainty. 
2 1 See J. Habermas, 'Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault's 
Lecture on Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?'" in The New Conservatism: 
Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate, trans, and ed. by Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 173-179. 
2 2 Michel Foucault, "Was Ist Aufklärung?" p. 45, in The Foucault Reader, 
ed. by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984). 
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One reasons many philosophers have been so hostile to Nietzsche, and 
other postmodern philosophers, and I would include Wittgenstein here as 
well (note Russell's rejection of Wittgenstein's later work), is that they 
were not playing the game properly and were simply ruled out of order. 
The "game" was taken as speaking properly about "the way things are" or 
at least the game is getting us closer to "the way things are." 
When subject-centered rationality and the standards of logic are 
decentered and seen as creative fictions in the larger context of imagination 
and creativity, or as useful in the pragmatism of the everyday, there is a 
radical "gestalt" shift, a different way of seeing things. Old problems 
about "the way things are," in any foundationalist universal sense, are not 
solved but dissolved, rendered impotent to exercise any influence on us. 
They have no control over a thinker who has shed the use of language that 
led to the problems from the beginning. These problems and ways of using 
language that gave rise to them, become relics that may linger in our 
language, but do not exercise any power over us. But this is terribly 
traumatic to those who do not make the shift, e.g., Frege, or who do make it 
but still wish to address old problems without the old tools or language, 
e.g., Habermas. This is not to say we do not think anymore or can not draw 
inferences, or that the world "truth" has no use. Rather, how all this is 
understood has radically changed. The language of transcendental 
metaphysics and traditional empiricist epistemology lingers only as a 
manner of speaking. 
The claim Russell makes in his introduction to The Tractatus, ("the 
essential business of language is to assert or deny facts"), is no longer true or 
false, just no longer an issue. Claims are still "true" or "false" but only in 
the context in which they are made. One no longer thinks of "independent" 
facts to which statements correspond. "Facts" are now context dependent. 
The "context" is itself a variable which has enough fixity to render claims 
true or false and meaning possible. Literal discourse is no longer that 
which either does or does not conform to the "real," to the facts,but is that 
part of our language which is for the moment providing the fixity any 
discourse and way of life requires in order to function. As Wittgenstein says 
of truth and language, 
it might be imagined that some propositions, of the 
form of empirical propositions, were hardened and 
functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as 
were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation 
altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, 
and hard ones became fluid. 2 3 
2 3 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von 
Wright (new York: Harper, 1972), Section 96. 
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If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor vet 
false. 2 4 
One of Wittgenstein's central purposes was to expose the widespread 
transcendental conception of necessary conditions, rules and fixity and 
dissolve the philosophical problems that led to such thinking. 
Wittgenstein's method of descriptions offers an alternative 
nontranscendental view in which the meaning of names and rules can 
fluctuate with circumstances, yet retains enough fixity for our purposes. 
Wittgenstein is not skeptical about the connection between rule and 
application. Rather, he is skeptical about a certain kind of explanation we 
give to ourselves in understanding such connection, i.e., empirical and 
essentialist explanations.2* The implications of this for any attempt to 
2 4 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1958), Section 205. 
2 5 For Wittgenstein, description of how we actually do things within 
language is the proper course for philosophy. 'The connection between rule 
and its application, intentional act and its object is grounded on a pre-
philosophical 'trust' or 'bedrock' of action. It is the job of the philosopher 
to describe and elucidate the language games and forms of life that made 
this trust and action possible, not to question the validity of that trust ?r 
action, nor try to justify or ground it. "It is our language games and forms of 
life that determine the nature of our "logic"—a logic that is necessarily 
impure because its wellsprings are use and practice. The standard of logic 
or an ideal reason is not the measure of correct use and practice." (Quoted 
from Henry McDonald, "Crossbroads of Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Derrida, 
and Ostensive Definition" in The Philosophical Forum, Vol. XXI, No. 3, 
Spring, 1990.) Rather, the standard must be altered so as to conform to use 
and practice. "No course of action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course of action could be make out to accord with the rule" L. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 201). A rule is not prior to 
it application. 
According to Wittgenstein, ostensive definition can be variously 
interpreted in every case. What constitutes correctness in any give case 
"will depend on the circumstances under which it is given, and on the 
person I give it to." (PI Sec. 29) 'The ostensive definition explains the use-
the meaning-of the word when the overall form of the word in language is 
clear." (PI Sec. 30) 
2 6 We do not have to posit some fixed apriori basis by which language is 
connected to reality. Rather, we can and need only look and see the ways in 
which we act and speak, just see how we do things. There is no need for an 
explanation of how it is possible. Rules are read out of human activity. 
They are only secondarily distilled and then applied to such activity. 
There is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which 
is exhibited in what we call 'obeying a rule' and 'going against it' in actual 
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show an ideal standpoint which provides the necessary preconditions for 
rational discourse, such as habermas's, is that no such standpoint is fixed or 
ideal, and that it is not needed at all. it is language "gone on holiday," 
doing no work. 
The real value of transcendental arguments is not what they have 
proven but what they have shown us. They have not revealed the absolute 
limits of thought or communication as Kant, Frege, Husserl, and now 
Habermas have tried to show. They have shown something about the 
nature of thought and language when it tries to reflect on itself. The 
orderliness of any system of language and thought can be distilled and 
tuned back upon that system to show that orderliness can be expressed by 
rules that are necessary to that system. Any system of knowledge and 
meaning can be shown to presuppose some set of categories, some conception 
of truth and consistency that would make that system of knowledge or 
meaning possible in its own terms in order to achieve its aim of providing 
fixity and coherence. It seems the notion of self-reference is the key to the 
process of justification in any transcendental arguments about necessary 
conditions and is unavoidable. Kant and Frege were looking for the fixed 
absolute limits, the necessary conditions of language and knowledge. But 
the limits of language and knowledge they sought to expose, depended upon 
those very limits themselves. 
What the failure of Kant and Frege have shown is that no limit is 
absolute, but that limits are absolutely necessary. Their philosophies 
have helped us the latter much more clearly, if not also the former by the 
problems their philosophies encountered. 
Kant and Frege showed us that some set of limits or rules, which can be 
conceived of int he form of logical and transcendental requirements for 
thought, knowledge, and communication, are "necessary" to order and 
coherence in the sense that they can be "read o f f or distilled from that 
order as "preconditions." But in a post Nietzschean world we now realize 
that no such limit is absolute/universal. Habermas has not caught up with 
this yet. He is still pursuing the goal of emancipation through rational 
grounding to solve the problems of late capitalism in the context of a 
postmodern world. But this new context changes everything. In a post-
cases." (L. Wittgenstein, PI, Sec. 201) "we ought to restrict the term 
'interpretation* to the substitution of one expression of the rule for 
another." "Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from 
seeing the facts" (PI, Sec. 79) The facts are revealed in our behavior. 
Prediction, hypothesis, explanation, causality are characteristic of an 
empirical and scientific method that is inappropriate for philosophy. (PI 
Sec. 109) Philosophy is concerned with description of phenomena as shown 
through use, practice,behavior, doing. (See Henry McDonald, "Crossroads 
of Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Ostensive Definition," in The 
Philosophical Forum, Vol. XXi, No. 3, Spring 1990, p. 268. 
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Nietzschean world God is dead and any transcendental universalist 
approach to grounding truth is just another metanarrative. Given the 
conditions of postmodernism, until Habermas rids himself of the 
Kantian/Hegelian features of his view, he will less likely be successful in 
combatting the usurpation of one area of cultural activity (the life 
world/communicative reason) by another (economic/instructmental reason). 
Lawrence Cahoone 2 7 believes that if the most valuable components of 
Habermas's theory are to be preserved, the categories associated with the 
philosophy of consciousness dating back to Hegel and Kant which are still 
present in Habermas must be isolated and eliminated. The rationalist 
assumptions he still carries are not only unnecessary to account for the 
conditions of late modernity but unwarranted in the face of postmodern 
insights. 
The notion of an ideal or unconditioned moment of communication is 
very Kantian and the distinction between life-world and system seems to be 
very similar tot he Kantian dichotomy of reason and nature, the dichotomy 
of inside and outside, the realm of freedom and value versus necessity and 
fact. Parallel to Kant's scheme of reason, rationality divides into the 
spheres of cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-
practical. But we can think of the division of rationality in another way 
using a quite different model to interpret our experience. 
Cahoone, using Justus Buchicr as a guide, points out that the intrusion 
of instrumental reason into the life world is not the intrusion of one realm 
into another as Habermas sees it, but the splitting off of one social order 
that has become dominant, insulated and unresponsive to the others. There 
is not a lifeworld but lifeworlds, not a communication community, but 
communities, and the individual is a crossroads of many communities. 
Freedom then is the availability of different perspectives. "A decrease in 
plurality of perspective would tend to rigidify community, shrink 
individuality toward uniformity and unity and diminish or undercut query, 
social and even reflexive communication, and the possibility of 
rationality," i.e., freedom of choice. 2 8 
Habermas's failure to grasp adequately the significance of Nietzsche, 
as indicated in his chapter on Nietzsche in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity, as well as of later "postmodernists" such as Derrida and 
Foucault, has prevented him from seeing that his own philosophy, in its 
struggle to ground a normative ethics in a theory of communicative action, 
still trades unnecessarily on the universalistic dichotomous categories 
inherent in modernism. Unrealistic and misguided expectation with regard 
to certainty and the hoped for discovery of some absolute and universal 
grounding of our moral judgments can itself be much more dangerous than not 
2 7 Lawrence Cahoone, "Buchler on Habermas on Modernity," in The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVH, No. 4 (1989). 
2 8 Ibid, p. 468. 
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having such a grounding. The lack of an absolute does not carry the same 
risk of nihilism that the failure of an absolute does. Habermas finds 
relativism dangerous and unacceptable. But if one gives up hope of 
universalism then one can give up the idea of relativism as well. There is 
no point trying to find shadings between the poles of relative and absolute. 
The distinction is a relic of a rationalist conception of truth that only 
serves to obscure, rather than clarify. Relativism only makes sense in 
relation to absolutism and implies a point of reference to which or from 
which it has its limited legitimacy. From a postmodern perspective, there 
is neither a unified subject nor object to provide such a point of reference. 
These have been dissolved along with anything absolute. The notion of 
truth has been jettisoned altogether, relative or absolute. The notion a of 
"truth" itself has traditionally implied closure. If one has the truth, any 
further movement could only be a deviation from it. The notion of "insight" 
might be a good substitute because it avoids this connotation. Any insight 
does not prevent the movement to further insight. It would, however, make 
little sense to speak of relative or absolute insights. 
One might admire Habermas's sustained attempt to carry forward the 
enterprise of always binding their and practice together in the pursuit of 
human emancipation. But Habermas has ceratin assumptions about the 
fundamental status of politics and theorizing that leads him to conclusions 
that are critical of those who do not share these assumptions and he begs 
the question of the legitimacy of such assumptions in his criticism of 
postmodernists for committing a "performative contradiction." Likewise, 
his assumptions about the fundamental nature of politics lead him to 
question begging criticisms of postmodernists for being "apolitical."29 
2 9 See James Ogilvy, Many Dimensional Man: Decentralizing Self, Society, 
and the Sacred (New York: Harper Colophon, 1979). If the question being 
raised by postmodernism is about the very fundamentality of politics as 
well as the political/apolitical dichotomy, among other, then Habermans 
is begging the question by faulting postmodernists for being apolitical. His 
efforts to show that politics is grounded in a fundamental drive toward 
emancipation presupposes the centrality of political life, especially a 
Western form of political life. According to Ogilvy, the notion of 
"political: is an invention, a theoretical device that may well have 
outlived its usefulness and is now counterproductive. It is a linguistic tool 
that grew out of a way of life. It is not foundational. Even if emancipation 
is very basic, "politics" is not thereby implicated in this way as well. 
Ogilvy makes a very strong case against monism in favor of pluralism 
and multidimcnsionality. The old battle of man against nature has been 
essentially won by man thanks to the tools of politics and technology. Now 
our battle is with the uncontrolled wilderness of politics and technology, a 
battle to be fought with tools yet to be invented, tools postmodernists are 
attempting to develop and experiment with. The one dimensionality of our 
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The issue of legitimacy and justification cannot be settled in advance 
and then be used to attack those who do not conform. Postmodernism is a 
movement which questions these very notions of legitimacy and 
justification even though they must use the language and conceptual 
framework that "presuppose" them in order to carry out their critique of 
reason and language. To attack postmodernists for "violating" these 
conditions and committing "performative contradictions" begs the question 
of whether such assumptions about reason and communication can every be 
fundamental and necessary conditions. Any notion that requires itself as 
"unavoidable" is suspicious to postmodernists. This tyranny of reason is 
only possible if one makes an initial leap of faith with regard to reason. In 
Nietzschean terms, it makes a perspective into the perspective necessary to 
all perspectives. Such a move is to presuppose what is at issue. The fact 
that such notions appear unavoidable is at the center of self-reference. One 
either sees the circularity and gains an insight into the nature of reason or 
one does not and continues to push for the necessity of some rules. But if 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are our guides here, such "necessity" is only 
contingent. 
To speak generally of necessity and contingency, of absolute and 
relative, is to already have bought into dichotomous thinking that has 
gone beyond the bounds of its contextual utility. What is the context of such 
claims and divisions? We cannot achieve an absolute orientation to 
everything else. We create the orientation. Accepting rules of reason and 
the notion of universality is an orientation that attempts to step outside 
itself and proclaim itself "objective." But we can never outrun our 
orientation, our perspective, and can never achieve the objectivity of a 
view from everywhere, (which is nowhere). The attempt to prove this 
results in a regress of proofs of consistency and completeness exposed in 
contemporary philosophy of logical nd in posmodcrnists' exposure of the 
reflexive nature of any attempt at justification by appeal to a universal or 
generalized perspective. Any attempt at "closure" on this issue would 
itself be self-refuting in requiring an unsupported assumption at some point. 
To universalize any rule is to ignore the context of particularity that 
gives rise to the desire to universalize in the first place. There is in fact 
always already a context of meaning in which we are operating. That 
context is inescapable if we are to be discussing anything at all. It is this 
obvious fact that is overlooked in the rush toward the fixity of universals 
arrived at by "pure reason." 
old monotheistic theology, the singular self, power politics, etc., is being 
replaced by the relational thought of pluralism. Even though 
communicative ethnic makes an advance over many earlier attempts at 
ethics in some important respects, it fails because of its Kantain monistic 
apriori universalism. 
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The notions of emancipation, individuality, community, harm, and 
consensus all fail to have sufficient fixity that would allow any universal 
rational truth being asserted about them independently of the linguistic 
context in which they do their work. Habermas's discourse ethics is a 
requirement for all discourse under any conditions whatsoever. It imposes 
standards of rationality by which any discourse would be deemed 
acceptable and to which it must conform. But if these "rules" of discourse 
are truly universal, they must apply to any discourse about themselves and 
must themselves be arrived at by rational discourse. This, in turn, must be 
governed by these same rules which must already be operating in order to 
even have any rational discourse at all about the rules, ad infinitum. If we 
attempt to impose this universal requirement then the problem of sclf-
referentiality, which is a feature of all our language and reason, is made 
into a problem. Self-referentiality is only a problem for one who tries to 
out run it and arrive at some independent standpoint which excludes itself 
in taking things into account, in providing THE way of seeing or judging 
things. 
We cannot live a coherent meaningful existence without "truth" or 
fixity in some sense. It is never the case that anything goes. A coherent 
meaningful life requires imposing some order upon the flux of existence. 
What postmodernists have seen is the self-deception of universal 
requirements of reason, but equally, the necessity of fixity and structure. 
They believe we can have the latter without the former. Habermas, who 
is still short of this insight, attempts to do what, in light of 
postmodernism, is not feasible or desirable. Habermas can be the 
Deweyian democratic pragmatist he wants to be without resorting to the 
foundation of an ideal moment of communicative consensus.30 
3 0 See J. Habermas "Questions and Counterquestions," in Richard Bernstein, 
Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p. 198. "Like 
Rorty, I have long identified myself with that radical democratic 
mentality which is present in the best American traditions and articulated 
in American pragmatism." But unlike Rorty who appeals to the maturity 
of "we" and can only recommend it, Habermas attempts to ground and 
justify it. 
